United States v. Bagley (1984)
- Docket
- 84-48
- Decided
- 1984-01-01
Summary
Question: Must Bagley’s convictions for narcotics violations be set aside as a violation of due process because the government failed to disclose that two witnesses were impeachable, although the district judge determined that this failure did not affect the outcome of the case? Conclusion: No. In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the government’s failure to disclose the contacts in discovery did not violate the Due Process Clause. Justice Blackmun wrote that the state was required by due process to disclose evidence that was both favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment, and that impeachment evidence fell within this requirement. He rejected, however, the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the government’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence required automatic reversal. The Court was concerned with undisclosed impeachment evidence that directly restricted the scope of cross-examination; here, Bagley’s counsel was free to cross-examine the informants on any relevant subject. Relying on United States v. Agurs , Justice Blackmun held that undisclosed evidence was material if there was a reasonable possibility that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed. He acknowledged that the government’s failure likely lead the defense counsel to believe that the informants could not be impeached on the basis of bias or inducements offered by the government. Nonetheless, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome would have been the same if the government had disclosed the evidence in question. Justice Blackmun reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. Justice Byron White concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist. He would have simply held that the proper standard was one of reasonable probability and that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the standard necessities reversal. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He argued that a failure to disclose cannot be considered harmless when the government withholds evidence that might impeach the prosecution’s only witnesses. He wrote that the majority’s standard encouraged prosecutors to withhold potentially dispositive evidence. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He noted that the analysis in Agurs was restricted to the context where the defense made either a general request for evidence or no request at all, not a specific request for impeachment evidence. He rejected the majority’s results-based test for materiality. Justice Louis Powell took no part in the decision of the case.