Johnson v. Texas (1992)
- Docket
- 92-5653
- Decided
- 1992-01-01
Summary
Question: Did the Texas capital sentencing statute unconstitutionally preclude the jury from fully considering the mitigating effect of the petitioner's youth at the time of the crime? Conclusion: No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority and held that the procedure set forth by the Texas capital sentencing statute was constitutional with respect to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a lengthy discussion of past decisions regarding the constitutional requirements regarding the consideration of mitigating circumstances in capital cases, the Court ultimately held that the Texas capital sentencing statute allowed adequate consideration of Johnson's youth because the jury was instructed to determine the probability that the petitioner would be a continuing threat to society and to consider any mitigating evidence with which they were presented. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion. He emphasized that the sentencer's consideration of relevant mitigating evidence ought to be channeled. He stated that the kind of channeling of mitigating discretion practiced in Texas should not merely be permitted, but required. Justice Clarence Thomas also filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the ruling, but added that he believed the Court wrongly decided Penry v. Lynaugh . Justice Sandra Day O'Connor dissented, joined by Justices Harry A. Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, and David Souter. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the jury was not allowed to give full effect to the mitigating evidence of Johnson's youth and stated that the sentence should have been remanded.