Glasser v. United States (1940)

Docket
30
Decided
1940-1955-

Summary

Question: <p>1. Does a criminal defense lawyer’s conflict of interest arising from simultaneous representation of co-defendants violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel?</p> <p>2. Does the exclusion of women from the jury pool violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury consisting of a fair cross-section of the community?</p> Conclusion: <p>1. A defense lawyer’s conflict of interest arising from a simultaneous representation of co-defendants violates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel.</p> <p>2. The exclusion of women (other than members of the League of Women Voters who had taken a jury training class) from the jury pool violates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury consisting of a fair cross-section of the community.</p> <p>In an opinion by Justice Frank Murphy, the Court reversed the conviction of Glasser (No. 30) and affirmed the convictions of the other two defendants (Nos. 31 and 32). The assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment requires that such assistance be “untrammeled and unimpaired” by a court order appointing one lawyer to represent multiple defendants, despite conflicting interests. Not only did Stewart have conflicting interests, but those conflicts prejudiced Glasser. The Court declined to calculate exactly the degree of prejudice to Glasser by the conflict of interest but described such a calculus as “at once difficult and unnecessary.” The Court concluded that neither Kretske and Rother were prejudiced, so it declined to reverse their convictions.</p> <p>The Court further held that in the selection of federal juries, the understandable desire for competent jurors should not lead to the result of a jury that is not a fair cross-section of the community. Thus, the exclusion of women, except those members of the League of Women Voters who had taken a jury training class, violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury consisting of a fair cross-section of the community. </p> <p>Justice Felix Frankfurter filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Harlan Stone joined. Frankfurter argued that Glasser, by remaining silent, had acquiesced to the appointment and waived his right to appeal by not objecting. Moreover, he argued that the joint representation benefited Glasser.</p> <p>Justice Robert Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.</p>

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