Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1980)
- Docket
- 79-6423
- Decided
- 1980-01-01
Summary
Question: Did the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require North Carolina to provide Abby Gail Lassiter with counsel in a proceeding to permanently and irrevocably terminate her parental rights? Conclusion: No. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to appoint counsel for Lassiter. Justice Stewart emphasized that due process required fundamental fairness. He wrote, however, that the Court generally only recognized an indigent’s right to appointed counsel where the litigant could lose his physical liberty if he lost the litigation. Justice Stewart looked to the Court’s due process standard in Mathews v. Eldridge , determining that 1) Lassiter’s interest was important, 2) the state shared with Lassiter a common interest in a correct decision, but also a pecuniary interest and an interest in informal procedures, and 3) the complexity of some proceedings could be great enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a parent’s rights insupportably high. He refused to hold, however, that indigent parents were entitled to counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights. He acknowledged that thirty-three states and the District of Columbia required counsel in termination hearings, but characterized this as wise public policy and not a constitutional requirement. Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred, implying that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted because the termination proceeding was not punitive. Justice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. He argued that the unique importance of a parent’s interest in the care and custody of his or her child could not be constitutionally extinguished through formal judicial proceedings without the benefit of counsel. Justice Blackmun disagreed that physical confinement was the only loss of liberty serious enough to trigger a right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause. He also emphasized the risk of error in termination proceedings when a parent lacked counsel. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented separately to take Justice Blackman's reasoning one step further. Justice Stevens opined that the issue raised is one of fundamental fairness, not balancing of pecuniary costs against societal benefits. No benefit to society can justify the state depriving an individual's liberty without due process of law.