Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (1985)
- Docket
- 85-5
- Decided
- 1985-01-01
Summary
Question: (1) Did the Clean Air Act authorize attorneys' fees for DVCCCA and EPA’s non-litigation activities? (2) Did the Third Circuit properly affirm awarded multipliers for DVCCCA and EPA’s superior work opposing Pennsylvania’s motion to stay the consent decree? Conclusion: Yes and no. In a decision written by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the district court appropriately awarded the DVCCCA and the EPA attorneys’ fees and costs for non-litigation work. Justice White noted the unusual nature of the plaintiffs’ dispute with Pennsylvania, given that the DVCCCA and the EPA were essentially tasked with protecting the full scope of the consent decree both in and out of court. He looked to the legislative history of the CAA, wherein Congress used the phrases “action” and “proceeding” interchangeably; this suggested to Justice White that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase “action” to litigation. Justice White agreed, however, with Pennsylvania’s contention that the Third Circuit erred in awarding plaintiffs attorneys’ fees for “superior work”. He outlined the history of the Court’s “lodestar” approach to attorneys’ fees, reasoning that any reasonable “lodestar” approach would already account for attorneys’ superior work. Justice White cautioned that the district court’s award risked double counting attorneys’ work. He declined to consider whether the district court erred in multiplying attorneys’ to compensate for plaintiffs’ low chance of success. Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall. Justice Blackmun agreed that the district court appropriately awarded the DVCCCA and EPA attorneys’ fees for work performed out of court to protect the consent decree. He took issue with the majority’s decision to defer ruling on the district court’s multipliers for plaintiffs’ low chance of success. Justice Blackmun also rejected the Court’s limited interpretation of the “lodestar” approach to attorneys’ fees, arguing that the district court reasonably adjusted fees based on the quality of work performed. Justice William Brennan joined Blackmun’s dissent on this point alone.