District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne (2008)
- Docket
- 08-6
- Decided
- 2008-01-01
Summary
Question: 1) May 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be used to obtain post-conviction access to evidence when there is no pending claim for which that evidence could be utilized? 2) Does the 14th Amendment's due process clause afford the plaintiff the right to obtain post-conviction access to evidence when plaintiff's intended claim is foreclosed by evidence obtained through confession? Conclusion: Maybe and no. The Supreme Court held that even assuming that Mr. Osborne could pursue his claims using § 1983, he had no constitutional right to obtain post-conviction access to the state's DNA evidence used against him at trial. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court deferred to the legislative branch in establishing rules by which convicts can obtain DNA evidence to pursue postconviction relief. It recognized that while the Alaska legislature had yet to establish such procedures, its court system was making progress. Moreover, the Court held that Mr. Osborne's due process rights were not violated, reasoning that Alaska's postconviction relief procedures were adequate. Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Thomas. He agreed with the majority's opinion, but also stated that Mr. Osborne's claim failed for two other reasons. First, he argued that § 1983 was an inappropriate mechanism for pursuing a federal constitutional right claim when the claim had not been exhausted at the state court level. Second, he argued that Mr. Osborne's claim should be rejected because a defendant who chooses not to have DNA testing done at the trial level for tactical reasons should not have access to such testing in pursuing postconviction relief. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice David H. Souter. He strongly disagreed with the majority holding that prevented Mr. Osborne from having access to evidence that could conclusively prove his guilt or innocence, and thus could ensure justice had been achieved. Justice Souter also dissented. He argued that Alaska had failed to provide sufficiently effective postconviction relief procedures to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and thus Mr. Osborne should have had access to the DNA evidence he sought.