Firefighters v. City of Cleveland (1985)
- Docket
- 84-1999
- Decided
- 1985-01-01
Summary
Question: Does Section 706(g) of Title VII preclude a court from approving a consent decree that provides relief that may benefit individuals who were not the actual victims of the defendant’s discriminatory practices? Conclusion: No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Section 706(g) does not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree. Although a consent decree has several characteristics of a judicial order, the Court found that it was not an “order” for purposes of Section 706(g) because of its voluntary, contractual nature. Additionally, the legislative history surrounding the enactment of Title VII suggests that Congress intended to encourage private, voluntary remedies for past discrimination. Because the consent decree did not “bind Local 93 to do or not to do anything,” it did not preclude the union from raising claims it may have under other laws, such as the unlawful employment provisions of Title VII. In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasized the narrow nature of the majority’s opinion. Even though the union had not raised the claims before the Court in its petition for certiorari, the non-minority employees retained the ability to challenge the consent decree under Section 703 of Title VII or the 14th Amendment. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent in which he argued that the consent decree fell under the purview of Section 706(g) and therefore was not a permissible remedy for past discrimination because it benefited minorities who may not have been the actual victims of the City’s racially discriminatory promotional system for firefighters. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that a consent decree is a judicial order and subject to the limitations of Section 706(g). He wrote that the district court’s failure to make a finding about past discrimination toward each minority firefighter who would receive preferential treatment under the new promotional system rendered the consent decree an impermissible judicial order. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined the dissent.