Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools (1987)
- Docket
- 86-7113
- Decided
- 1987-01-01
Summary
Question: 1. Was Kadrmas’ petition for a writ of certiorari barred because she was contracting for bus service with Dickinson Public Schools while her appeal was pending? 2. Did the application of a busing fee by Dickinson Public Schools deprive Sarita Kadrmas of a minimum access to education? 3. Did the application of a busing fee by Dickinson Public Schools to students at some but not all districts deprive students of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: No, no, and no. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court held that North Dakota’s statute allowing non-reorganized schools to charge busing fees did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice O’Connor first rejected the district’s contention that Kadrmas’ was barred from appeal because her daughter was enjoying the benefits of the district’s bus service. She noted that the legislature authorized bus service through a different statute, and characterized the fee as a burden to Kadrmas, not a benefit. She also held that the case was not moot, in part because a decision in Kadrmas’ favor would relieve them from future assessments for bus service. Justice O’Connor interpreted Kadrmas’ argument to mean that the busing fee unconstitutionally placed a greater obstacle to education on poorer families. Justice O’Connor disagreed that the Court must subject the statute to heightened scrutiny, in part because the government did not penalize Sarita for her parents’ conduct. Justice O’Connor also rejected Kadrmas’ argument that North Dakota was constitutionally barred from withholding bus services from those unable to pay because those services were especially important. Unlike court access and court remedies, North Dakota did not maintain a legal or practical monopoly on the means of transporting children to school. Moreover, the Kadrmas family could and did find a private alternative to the public school bus service. Justice O’Connor also held that the statute did not violate equal protection by only allowing fees for bus service in non-reorganized schools. She wrote that Kadrmas failed to demonstrate that the statute was both arbitrary and irrational. The purpose of the statute was to encourage reorganization through the expansion of districts’ tax bases, and the fees existed to encourage voters to approve school district reorganization. She noted that voters in reorganized districts could approve bus service fees as well. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He characterized the majority’s ruling as a retreat from the promise of equal education opportunity. He argued that North Dakota’s actions placed a special burden on poor families in their pursuit of education and discriminated on the basis of economic status. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Harry Blackmun. He argued that once voters in a district decided whether or not to reorganize, there was no longer a rational basis for denying free bus transportation to students in that particular district.