Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1972)
- Docket
- 71-732
- Decided
- 1972-01-01
- Public Good score
- 42 / 100
- Framers' Intent score
- 48 / 100
Summary
Question: (1) Did the court of appeals err when it held that the search of the car was invalid because the state failed to show consent given with knowledge that it could be withheld? (2) Should claims relating to search and seizure be available to a prisoner filing a writ of habeus corpus? Conclusion: Yes, No answer. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that whether consent is voluntary can be determined from the totality of the circumstances. It is unnecessary to prove that the person who gave consent knew that he had the right to refuse. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not require a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Because the Fourth Amendment claims had no merit, the Court did not reach the second question. Justice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the main question should be whether Bustamonte had a fair opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claims. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, agreeing with the majority and noting it was unnecessary to reach the issue discussed by Justice Powell. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the Ninth Circuit made the correct decision. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate dissent, stating that a person cannot waive their Fourth Amendment rights when he is unaware that his rights would be constitutionally protected if he did not waive those rights. Justice Thurgood Marshall arguing that the prosecution cannot rely on consent to a search if the person who gave consent did not know he could refuse consent.