Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya (1983)
- Docket
- 82-91
- Decided
- 1983-01-01
Summary
Question: Should the “continuous physical presence” requirement for suspension of deportation in the Immigration and Nationality Act be interpreted literally? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 9-0 court. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of any language or legislative history indicating flexibility in the requirements, the section should be interpreted based on its plain meaning. Other immigration legislation has shown that when Congress intends there to be exceptions, the wording of the relevant statute reflects that intention. The Court also held that Congress intended the requirements to present a high threshold to suspension, and therefore the “continuous presence” requirement should not be interpreted loosely. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that Phinpathya’s unexplained three-month absence from the country was enough to disqualify her from a suspension of deportation without requiring the Supreme Court to address the issue of the meaning of the “continuous presence” requirement. He argued further that Congress did not intend the requirement to be taken literally in situations that would be unreasonable, but rather it was intended to prevent abuses. Legislative and judicial history supported a more flexible reading of the requirement. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.