Irving Independent School District v. Tatro (1983)
- Docket
- 83-558
- Decided
- 1983-01-01
Summary
Question: Was the provision of CIC for a student with a neurogenic bladder a required ‘related service’ under the Education of the Handicapped Act? If so, could the Tatros seek attorneys’ fees through the Rehabilitation Act although other relief was available under the EHA? Conclusion: Yes and no. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that the provision of CIC was a ‘related service’ and not a ‘medical service’ under the Education of the Handicapped Act. He looked to the text of the EHA, which defined ‘related service’ as that which is required for a handicapped child to benefit from special education. Chief Justice Burger noted that Amber would not be able to attend school and benefit from special education without CIC. He cited the Court’s previous holdings on the act, where it determined that congress intended to give handicapped children meaningful access to public education. Chief Justice Burger held that CIC was not a ‘medical service’ under the EHA. He deferred to the regulations of the Department of Education, which defined ‘medical services’ as those provided by a licensed physician. As CIC could be performed by a layperson and was required for Amber to attend school, it fell within both Congress’ and the Department of Education’s definitions of ‘related services’. Chief Justice Burger also held that the Tatros were not entitled to relief under the Rehabilitation Act because relief was available under the EHA. Hence, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the Tatros were entitled to attorneys’ fees. Justice William Brennan concurred in part, but dissented from the majority’s holding on the awarding of attorneys’ fees under the Rehabilitation Act. He referred to his dissent in Smith v. Robinson , where he similarly objected to that majority’s interpretation of a conflict between the EHA and the RA as an implicit repeal of parties’ right to seek attorneys’ fees. Justice Stevens concurred in part but also dissented to the majority’s holding on the awarding of attorneys’ fees. He noted that the district's petition for certiorari did not challenge the award of attorneys’ fees.