United States v. Dixon (1992)
- Docket
- 91-1231
- Decided
- 1992-01-01
Summary
Question: Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar prosecution of a defendant on substantive criminal charges based on the same conduct for which the defendant previously has been held in contempt of court? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the judgment of the court. Though not agreeing on an opinion, five justices agreed that the proper test was whether the offense in the second prosecution contained the same elements as the offense in the first. Five justices also agreed that double jeopardy did not bar the subsequent prosecutions in either case. Justice Scalia noted that Grady was wrongly decided and must be overruled. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the judgment. Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that the subsequent prosecutions did not violate double jeopardy under the same elements test. Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas joined in the opinion. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, arguing that double jeopardy bars prosecution for an offense if the accused has already been held in contempt for its commission. Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice David H. Souter joined in the opinion. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, writing that none of the subsequent prosecutions were barred because the interests served by contempt proceedings were fundamentally different from the interests served by criminal prosecution. Justice Souter concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, arguing that the same elements test was inadequate and Grady had been correctly decided. Justice Stevens joined in the opinion