Michigan v. Tyler (1977)
- Docket
- 76-1608
- Decided
- 1977-01-01
Summary
Question: Does the Fourth Amendment protection against illegal searches and seizures extend to investigations of burned premises for evidence of arson? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that any search for administrative purposes, such as to find evidence of a crime, requires a warrant. There are circumstances that require law enforcement agents to act without a warrant, such as when firemen enter a burning building. Once in the building for that purpose, the firemen may seize evidence of arson that is in plain view without obtaining a warrant. The Court also held that determining the cause of the fire is part of a fireman’s job, so firemen may remain in a building without a warrant after a fire has been extinguished for “a reasonable amount of time” to investigate. The Court held that the initial entry and the investigation on the following morning were constitutional, but the subsequent entries and seizures of evidence were not. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the Court’s finding that the entries of February 16 and beyond were illegal searches, but disagreed with the Court on the meaning of the Warrant Clause. He argued that a warrant is necessary when there is probable cause and the search must be unannounced to be effective. If there is no reason for such a confrontation, the Warrant Clause requires that the property owner be given fair warning of the search. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the Court applied the “reasonable amount of time” criterion too broadly in this case. He argued that there was no reason to consider the reentry of the premises the following morning a continuation of the original warrantless entry. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that reasonable searches of commercial premises do not require a warrant. The record showed that Tyler did not object to the searches as they were occurring, and therefore obviously considered them reasonable. Since Tyler no longer used the building after the fire, providing him fair notice would not have served a purpose either. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.