Grady v. Corbin (1989)
- Docket
- 89-474
- Decided
- 1989-01-01
Summary
Question: Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevent a person from being charged with more severe offenses after being tried and convicted of lesser ones for the same action? Conclusion: Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars subsequent prosecution if the offenses share identical elements or if one is a lesser-included offense within the other. A second prosecution is also prohibited if the second trial would require a re-litigation of the same factual issues as the first one. Because the state would use the crimes of which Corbin had already been convicted in order to establish elements of the subsequent charges, the Court held that the secondary charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a dissent where she argued that the majority’s opinion was inconsistent with the Court’s decision in a previous case from that term and takes too broad a view of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Double Jeopardy Clause only prevents double prosecution for the same offense, not necessarily the same action. He argued that the Clause had historically been interpreted as allowing multiple prosecutions if a single action violated multiple laws. He argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily complicated and limited the courts’ ability to try a person for multiple crimes stemming from the same action. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined the dissent.