Doe #1 v. Reed (2009)
- Docket
- 09-559
- Decided
- 2009-01-01
Summary
Question: 1) Does the First Amendment protection of political speech, association, and belief require strict scrutiny when a state compels the public release of identifying information about petition signers? 2) Is compelling public disclosure of identifying information about petition signers narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, and did the petitioners meet all the elements required for a preliminary injunction? Conclusion: No. Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the disclosure of referendum petitions does not as a general matter violate the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that an "exacting scrutiny standard" is the appropriate standard for determining First Amendment challenges in the electoral context. The standard requires a "substantial relation" between the disclosure requirement and a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. Here, the state met its burden in establishing that its disclosure requirement was constitutional. Justice Samuel A. Alito concurred. He noted that the Court's opinion did not bar "as applied" exemptions from the PRA's disclosure requirements. To obtain an exemption, a speaker must show "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also concurred. She agreed that in this case, given the relative weight of the interests at stake and the traditionally public nature of the referendum process, the Court correctly rejected the constitutional challenge to the PRA. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He opined that this was "not a hard case" as it merely dealt with a neutral, nondiscriminatory policy of disclosing information already in the state's possession that might one day indirectly burden signatories. He did not view the burden imposed by the PRA as substantial. Justice Antonin Scalia also concurred in the judgment. He noted that a history indicates that the First Amendment does not prohibit public disclosure. He also doubted whether signing a petition fits within the definition of "freedom of speech" at all. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented. He argued that the PRA severely burdens the First Amendment right to free speech and "chills participation in the referendum process."