Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy (1993)

Docket
93-639
Decided
1993-01-01

Summary

Question: Does the Board's decision to censure Ibanez use of her CPA and CFP designations violate the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that Ibanez's use of her CPA and CFP designations constituted commercial speech, which can only be restricted if it can be proven to be false or misleading and the state has a substantial interest in restricting it. Because Ibanez is fully licensed, her use of the designations was neither false nor misleading. Without evidence that the commercial speech caused "real harms" and that limiting it would restrict those harms, the Board did not meet its burden to show a substantial state interest. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which she argued that Ibanez's use of the CFP designation was misleading. Because it appears in conjunction with the CPA designation, Justice O'Connor argued that the average consumer would be led to believe that a state licensing board controlled the use of both titles, which is not the case. Without listing the agency that regulates the use of the CFP title, the average consumer would be unable to verify this information. Because this designation is potentially misleading, the Board properly disciplined Ibanez with regard to the CFP designation. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.

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