National Labor Relations Board v. Lion Oil Company (1956)
- Docket
- 4
- Decided
- 1956-01-01
- Category
- General
Summary
Question: (1) By going on strike, did Lion Oil Company's union employees engage in activity that is not protected by the National Labor Relations Act because the collective bargaining agreement was still in effect? (2) Did the union employees breach their contract by going on strike? Conclusion: No and no. In a decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the union did not violate the terms of the National Labor Relations Act by going on strike. Chief Justice Warren rejected the Eighth Circuit’s narrower, more literal interpretation of the Act. He looked to the legislative history of the NLRA and concluded that while Congress recognized a duty to bargain over modifications when the contract itself contemplates such bargaining, it would make little sense to deprive unions’ of the threat of strike, a force depended upon to facilitate settlements with companies. Chief Justice Warren investigated the relevant language of the NLRA, determining that Congress intended “expiration date” to encompass both notice of a party’s desire to terminate or modify the contract and the date when the contract would normally expire. Hence, the union was not obligated to wait to strike until the contract’s actual expiration date. This conclusion was based in part on the Court’s ruling in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board . There, the Court recognized a dual purpose in the Act: to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare and to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities -- like strikes -- for their own benefit. Otherwise, the Chief Justice argued, unions would be wary of entering into long-term contracts at all. Chief Justice Warren thus concluded that the notice and waiting requirements of the Act were fully satisfied, as the strike did not occur until long after the union delivered notice of proposed amendments to the company. Chief Justice Warren also rejected the company’s contention that the strike was a breach of contract, holding that where a contract does not contain an express waiver of the right to strike, that waiver cannot be inferred. Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in part, taking issue only with the majority’s breach of contract ruling. He noted that the Eighth Circuit did not reach that issue because of its decision to set aside the Board’s ruling, and that the Board did not raise the issue on appeal. Justice John Harlan also concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority’s construction of the Act, but took issue with the majority’s ruling on the unfair labor practice charge. He also noted that the issue was not taken up by the Eighth Circuit, and strongly objected to the Court ruling on issues not decided by lower courts. Justice William Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.