Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (1986)
- Docket
- 85-701
- Decided
- 1986-01-01
Summary
Question: Did Massachusetts Citizens for Life violate the Federal Election Campaign Act by distributing flyers asking voters to vote “for life” paid for with treasury funds? Does that section of FECA violate the First Amendment as applied? Conclusion: Yes and yes. In an opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, the Court held unanimously that Massachusetts Citizens for Life’s flyers violated FECA’s prohibition on expenditures. He pointed to the general definitions section of FECA, where ‘expenditures’ included the provision of anything of value made for the purpose of influencing a federal election. Justice Brennan also looked to the legislative history and determined that Congress did not intend to abandon its restrictions on expenditures to support candidates. Justice Brennan rejected MCFL’s argument that it did not expressly advocate for a candidate, noting that the flyers exhorted readers to vote for specific ‘pro-life’ candidates. In a 5-4 majority, Justice Brennan also held that FECA was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL’s flyers. While acknowledging that FECA’s requirements were not an absolute restriction on MCFL’s First Amendment rights, he argued that they were a substantial restriction. He noted that MCFL was forced to comply with several burdensome requirements only because it was a corporation; these requirements potentially created a disincentive for engaging in political speech. Justice Brennan held that the state’s compelling interest in restricting corporate spending on elections did not extend to MCFL because 1) MCFL was formed for an exclusively political purpose, 2) it had no shareholders, and 3) it was not formed by a business corporation or labor union. He noted that even if FECA’s disclosure requirements no longer applied, MCFL was still required to identify anyone contributing over $200. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred with both of the majority’s holdings. She emphasized that the significant burden on MCFL arose from FECA’s additional organizational restrictions, and not from its higher disclosure requirements. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, dissented on the constitutionality of FECA. While acknowledging that the threat from corporate political activity varied depending on the characteristics of a particular corporation, he argued that these were distinctions in degree and not differences in kind. He described the majority’s three-part test as legislative in character.