Simmons v. South Carolina (1993)
- Docket
- 92-9059
- Decided
- 1993-01-01
Summary
Question: Does a state court’s refusal to instruct a jury in a sentencing trial that a defendant is ineligible for parole violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 7-2 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the lack of a specific instruction regarding the actual consequences of the jury’s decision led to Simmons being sentenced on the basis of essentially false information. The Due Process Clause grants defendants the right to “deny or explain” the evidence against them, and Simmons was not given the opportunity to do so regarding his potential future danger to society. Because evidence of future dangerousness often plays an important role in sentencing, preventing the jury from having access to the relevant information does not conform to the precedents established in Due Process jurisprudence. The Supreme Court also held that the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury were sufficient. The instructions the trial judge gave did nothing to dispel any misunderstanding the jury members might have had regarding the meaning of the possible sentences. Justice David H. Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the trial judge has a responsibility to dispel jury misunderstandings of sentencing terms, particularly when the jury explicitly requests such guidance. Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the concurrence. In her separate concurrence, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the most basic right the Due Process Clause protects is the right to be heard, which was denied to Simmons when he was prevented from clarifying his parole situation. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in judgment in which she argued that the Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant’s right to rebut the prosecution’s evidence against him. In a sentencing trial in which the prosecution bases its argument on the defendant’s future dangerousness, the Constitution requires that the defendant have the opportunity to provide evidence to the contrary. Proof that the defendant will not be released is sometimes the only way to rebut the prosecution’s evidence. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony Kennedy joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion creates an overbroad reading of the Due Process Clause’s power to override state law regarding the admissibility of parole information. Such an issue should be left to the states to decide individually, as there is no indication in the Constitution that the Due Process Clause requires such a strict national standard. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.